Before the Korean War, three divisions in the four fields were assigned to Korea. Why did the former strong army “not fight”?
Many people believe that China singled out the “17-nation allied forces” led by the United States, and that the volunteers were the undisputed “protagonist” of the Korean War.In fact, the volunteers were just the “friends” and “guests” invited by the Korean comrades. The war took place on the Korean Peninsula, and the “host” Korean People’s Army was supposed to be the “protagonist” of the Korean War.So why is there so little mention of the Korean People’s Army, which is supposed to be the star?Why did the volunteer army “turn back” and become the de facto “protagonist” of the war?Yang Dezhi, commander of the Volunteer Army, takes a photo with his DPRK comrades.On June 25, 1950, about 140,000 troops of the Korean People’s Army launched a fierce attack south of the 38th Parallel.The Korean People’s Army rushed all the way, and the South Korean army was routed and nearly wiped out by the Korean People’s Army.However, the situation on the battlefield changed dramatically with the intervention of American troops, especially when they landed at Incheon and cut off the rear of the Korean People’s Army.The Korean War took a turn for the worse. The Korean People’s Army fought and retreated, and the situation became increasingly passive.At this time, The North Korean leader Kim Il Sung urgently asked China to send troops to Korea, and chairman MAO Zedong responded positively.The Korean People’s Army was routed so quickly that the result surprised everyone, especially the senior leaders of the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, who cried “unbelievable”.The U.S. military did not underestimate the effectiveness of the Korean People’s Army before it intervened in the Korean civil war.Seeing the Fact that the Korean People’s Army beat the South Korean army and the South Korean army was helpless, the U.S. military analyzed that the fighting power of the Korean People’s Army should not be underestimated under the support of the Soviet Union.Not even a man as proud as General MacArthur could belittle the Korean People’s Army.This can be seen from the incident of the Incheon landing, which showed that the U.S. army gave its opponent a “strong medicine” from the very beginning.But the U.S. military did not expect the Korean People’s Army to show its weakness so quickly.The rapid rout of the Korean People’s Army also caught China by surprise.The people’s Liberation Army’s Fourth Field Army should be the least receptive to such an outcome.Senior generals such as Lim and Ra know that the Korean People’s Army is indeed vulnerable to an adversary like the US army.In any case, they also think, the consequences of the KPA’s defeat should not come soon enough.The “four Wild” senior generals based their thinking on their knowledge and trust of their forces.The Korean People’s Army alone has more than 40,000 officers and soldiers from the four fields.Many “four wild” generals in private discussions have, the topic of discussion is basically the same: in the “four wild” time, those who were transferred to the Korean People’s Army officers and men had been “down the mountain of the Northeast tiger”, each valiant, invincible.But why did they become so unbeatable once they joined the Korean People’s Army?Data show that at the end of the War of Liberation, more than 40,000 PLA officers and men were transferred from China and incorporated into the Korean People’s Army.Most of them belonged to the Fourth Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army.In the Korean War, because the Performance of the Chinese People’s Volunteers was really eye-catching, people often ignored the Korean People’s Army fighting alongside the volunteers.In late April 1948, Kim Il, the general political director of the Korean People’s Army, visited China and met Chairman MAO Zedong. Kim il Sung made a request to Chairman MAO on behalf of Kim Il Sung: He hoped to bring back the “Korean soldiers and units” of the PLA.The move is in preparation for the reunification of the Korean peninsula.With Chairman MAO zedong’s understanding and support, the 164th and 166th divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army broke away from the PLA and joined the Korean People’s Army on July 20 of that year.The 164th and 166th divisions were greatly enlarged in men and armament before embarking on the new journey.In accordance with the “four wild” Lin, Luo chief issued the order, “four wild” in the army of the Korean people (including our Korean officers and soldiers) was unified to 164 division, 166 division.The weapons and equipment of these two divisions have also been greatly updated, and the equipment level is much better than that of other units in the “Four Fields”.The first to embark on the journey was the 166th Division, led by Commander Fang Hushan (also political commissar). The 166th Division commanded three regiments with a total strength of 10,821 men.They also took away more than 100 pieces of artillery, 206 submachine guns, 104 heavy machine guns, 320 light machine guns, 588 pistols, more than 5,000 rifles, as well as a large number of artillery shells, bullets and other materials.The 164th Division, under the leadership of Division commander (and political commissar) Li Deshan, then headed for Korea. The 164th Division had three regiments with more than 10,000 troops.Like the 166th division, the 164th division took with it a great deal of armaments, including 945 horses, more than 100 pieces of artillery, 878 submachine guns, 281 light machine guns, 91 heavy machine guns, 722 pistols, 6,044 pikes and a great deal of ammunition of all kinds.In addition to the 164th and 166th divisions, siye began to gather Korean soldiers from other units in Zhengzhou, Henan province.By March 10, 1950, the “Siye” collected another 15,000 Korean officers and soldiers, who were reorganized into the independent 15th Division and independent Regiment and then transferred back to Korea.Other Koreans (ethnic Korean officers and soldiers) had already returned to Korea before the outbreak of the Korean War.For example, in the first half of 1948, more than 2,000 Ethnic Koreans returned to Korea and were reorganized into the 603 Motorized Regiment of the Korean People’s Army.From May to December 1949, about 4,000 Korean soldiers returned to Korea and were reorganized into Unit 766 of the Korean People’s Army.In June 1950, more than 1,000 Korean soldiers from the “Siye” railway unit returned to Korea and were reorganized into unit 584 of the Korean People’s Army.According to incomplete statistics, more than 40,000 Korean (and Korean) PLA soldiers returned to North Korea until the outbreak of the Korean War.According to the total strength of the Korean People’s Army at that time, the Korean (Korean ethnic) PLA soldiers who returned to Korea accounted for one third of the total strength of the Korean People’s Army.Compared with the other two-thirds of the Korean People’s Army, the soldiers who returned from the “four Fields” have experienced big battles and experienced the world, and their individual qualities are also very good.Therefore, many “siye” generals are optimistic that with more than 40,000 officers and soldiers “base”, over time, the Korean People’s Army is likely to become an invincible army like the “Siye” sweeping thousands of troops.The reality, however, is less rosy.Soldiers who returned to the North and joined the Korean People’s Army soon found that the reality they saw was not at all what they had imagined.First, the Korean People’s Army has a strong Soviet flavor inside and out.The Korean People’s Army completely followed the Soviet model in terms of military uniforms, ranks, weapons and equipment, and training methods.Compared with the PEOPLE’s Liberation Army, the uniforms of the Korean People’s Army soldiers were more crisp and beautiful, and the Soviet weapons were more luxurious and advanced than the “Wanguo” weapons of the PEOPLE’s Liberation Army.Look at the Korean People’s Army’s battle sequence.At the outbreak of the war, the Korean People’s Army had seven divisions, one tank brigade, four guard brigades, two independent guerrilla regiments and other attached units, with a total strength of 140,000.Only a few of these units are headed by former PLA officers who returned to North Korea.For example, The 6th Division is headed by Major General Bang Ho-san, the 10th Guard Brigade is headed by Major General Li Fang-nam, the 5th Division is headed by Major General Ma Sang-cheol, and the 7th Division is headed by Major General Choi In.The military commanders of the remaining units are North Korean officers with Soviet connections.Tanks, armored units and other technical arms, few PLA officers and soldiers from the “four fields” returned to the DPRK.The Soviet military advisers stationed in the Korean People’s Army were numerous and controlled almost all important aspects of the Korean People’s Army, from logistics to training to operations.Compared with the poorly equipped PEOPLE’s Liberation Army and volunteers, the Korean People’s Army is fabulously rich.They have not only six infantry divisions, three mechanized divisions and Soviet-style equipment, but also more than 150 military aircraft.Second, the officers and soldiers who returned to the DPRK from the Siye area were treated with cold shoulder. Their advantages were not taken seriously, but even looked down upon and suppressed.After returning to Korea from the “Four fields”, in order not to weaken the overall combat effectiveness of the troops, at the insistence of fang Hushan and other generals, these troops were basically not separated.The 164th division was reorganized into the 5th Division of the Korean People’s Army, the 166th division was reorganized into the 6th Division, and the 7th Division was composed of soldiers drawn from the 139th, 140th, 141st and 156th divisions of the former Siye.They all have rich combat experience, and many soldiers have several military MEDALS in their hands.However, their combat experience and achievements were ignored and ridiculed by Soviet advisers.Even people’s Army officers, who have never fought a major battle, despise the PLA’s tactical methods as “irregular” and “beneath the surface”.Despite the strong opposition of the returning soldiers, they forced them to learn Soviet tactics from the ground up, so that the advantages of those officers and men were “nil”.Therefore, the returning officers and soldiers failed to let the effective tactics and experience of the “Four Fields” take root and carry forward in the Korean People’s Army.Those valuable experiences have even become their “burden”, and many officers and men dare not even talk about the past on various occasions for fear of being laughed at.So how did the Korean People’s Army, trained by the Soviet Army, fight?In the Battle of Seoul, for example, the Korean People’s Army, with its excellent equipment and large number of soldiers, placed two divisions with no experience of large-scale warfare in the front line.They fought the South Korean forces who were holding on to Seoul in a “hard-and-furious” Soviet-style siege.As a result, the Korean People’s Army barely managed to take Seoul at the cost of a division and precious time.That gave the Americans a chance to regroup and make a comeback.Senior generals in the “four fields” were said to be puzzled by the briefing on the Korean People’s Army’s capture of Seoul.It was hard for them to understand that the 5th and 6th divisions of the Korean People’s Army had “invaded the South of the Yangtze River three times and protected the Rim of the Yangtze River four times”, and had also participated in large-scale battles such as the Battle of Liao and Shen and the siege of Liao Yaoxiang Corps.Chinese and Korean soldiers celebrate victory These officers and soldiers are so effective and skillful in their tactics that they would have no problem taking a small city of Seoul.They were perfectly capable of taking Seoul in a relatively short time with relatively few casualties.Why the Korean People’s Army did not use these two powerful brigades is beyond the minds of the generals.Strategic confusion and missteps.Before the volunteer army large-scale into the north, just took office of the volunteer army commander Peng Dehuai once ventured into the north alone.In a cable sent back to the military commission, Mr Peng wrote: “North Korea’s problems are much more serious than imagined. The strategy is unclear, the grass-roots level is paralyzed, the military command is naive and rigid, and the army is leaderless and the situation is worrying.”As Mr. Peng said, the Korean People’s Army has been in total disarray since the successful landing of American troops at the port of Incheon.This confusion is reflected in everything from big things like a general strategic reshuffle to concrete things like offensives and retreats.During the first and second battles of the Volunteers, the Korean People’s Army did not have an organized unit to participate in the war.It was not that the volunteers did not need the SUPPORT of the Korean People’s Army, nor that they intended to fight the “United Nations Forces” on their own, but that there were no established Korean People’s Army units at that time.Where did the Korean People’s Army go?The volunteers managed to find out that as the main force was decimated by the Americans, the surviving Korean People’s Army soldiers scattered, many hiding in the mountains.In order to rescue and collect these troops, the volunteers sent two reinforced battalions deep behind the enemy lines and managed to contact nearly 30,000 people’s Army soldiers who had strayed.It was the volunteers who rounded them up and helped them back in, re-establishing a unified chain of command.But even if the Korean People’s Army recovers, it is unlikely to regain its earlier fighting power.In subsequent operations, they were limited to covering flanks and fighting in secondary areas.North Korea’s strategic missteps are also reflected in the establishment of major policies.After the volunteers captured Seoul, Commander Peng Dehuai perceived some unfavorable factors to the battle situation, so he judged the situation and decided to give up Seoul.But the North Korean leader was clearly opposed to peng old manager’s decision, insisted that the volunteers continue to attack, quick and decisive liberation of the entire North Korea.General Peng dehuai and Comrade Kim Il Sung got into an argument, and finally, with the support of Chairman MAO Zedong and Comrade Stalin, the North Korean side changed its position.Since then, the Korean People’s Army has been replenished to the strength of three or four regiments.However, the overall combat effectiveness of the Korean People’s Army units is not high due to the serious defects of veterans with combat experience and the previous heavy equipment being stripped away.They were therefore unable to carry out the main attack and had to work with the volunteers in the secondary direction.In fact, from the day they crossed the Yalu River, the volunteers were the main force in the fight against the UN forces for most of the time.This is also the reason why people think that “The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army singled out the” 17-nation allied forces “led by the United States.Not all Korean People’s Army units are “unbeaten”, and the heroic units returning to the DPRK from the “Four Fields” are still formidable!Among the various units of the Korean People’s Army, the former PLA officers and soldiers who returned to Korea from the “four Fields” are a special group.Their combat effectiveness is unmatched by other divisions of the Korean People’s Army.General Fang Hushan is one of the representatives.After the Outbreak of the Korean War, Fang ho-san led the 6th Division first captured Kaesong and then ambushed the Hadong Pass, killing and wounding more than 500 American soldiers and taking more than 100 prisoners.Subsequently, Fang Hushan also led the 6th Division in the battle of Fengyanli heavy damage to the US 5th Enhanced regiment, so the US army called Fengyanli “valley of bloodshed”.The 6th Division is called the “ghost Division” by the U.S. army because of its tenacious fighting and varied tactics.All in all, they continued the heroic fighting style of the “Four Wild”. Although they changed their uniforms and changed their subordination, they still had a strong and powerful style.However, due to various factors, the Korean People’s Army suffered a devastating blow at the beginning of the war.One might ask: how could an army as valiant and skilled as the 6th Division end up so unbeatable?There are strategic and tactical issues, external and internal factors.Under the influence of various factors alternately, their combat effectiveness did not get normal play.Fortunately, the Chinese People’s Volunteers intervened in the war in time, and Commander Peng Dehuai firmly controlled the command of the army and carried out Chairman MAO’s strategic ideas consistently.This is the fundamental guarantee for the Chinese and Korean armies to defeat the “United Nations Army” headed by the United States and win the final victory against the United States and aid the DPRK!